University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
1963

The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement
Joseph G. Cook

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Fri Apr 8 15:00:31 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Joseph G. Cook, The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement, 13 COPYRIGHT L. Symp.
65 (1963).
ALWD 7th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement, 13 Copyright L. Symp.
65 (1963).
APA 7th ed.
Cook, J. G. (1963). The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement. Copyright Law
Symposium (ASCAP), 13, 65-86.
Chicago 17th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, "The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement," Copyright Law
Symposium (ASCAP) 13 (1963): 65-86
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, "The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement" [1963] 13 Copyright L
Symp 65.
AGLC 4th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, 'The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement' [1963] 13 Copyright
Law Symposium (ASCAP) 65
MLA 9th ed.
Cook, Joseph G. "The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement." Copyright Law
Symposium (ASCAP), 13, 1963, pp. 65-86. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Joseph G. Cook, 'The Fine Arts: What Constitutes Infringement' (1963) 13 Copyright L
Symp 65
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

NATIONAL THIRD PRIZE, 1963

The Fine Arts: What Constitutes
Infringement
By JOSEPH G. COOK
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA SCHOOL OF LAW

SOME 15,000 TO 20,000 years ago in a dimly lit recess of a
large cave on Blackacre, X, a man of unparalleled imagination and genius, in response to an inexplicable inspiration,
grasped a bit of prehistoric chalk and sketched upon a limestone wall the picture of a bison. Returning from the hunt, his
friends were exultant. Something strange and new had been
added to the history of civilization. They immediately realized
that X's talents should be protected, that his creativity should
be encouraged, that proper steps should be taken to ensure
that no second-rate imitator drew cheap copies of X's masterpiece in every other cave in the world, thereby decreasing the
value of Blackacre, which now possessed untold magical powers, not to speak of its practical values. X had become the
world's first artist. He had also become the recipient of the
first copyright.
Without a doubt, the history of art, and of copyright law,
did not begin in this fashion, but it is true that the creators of
works of the fine arts have been honored members of society
from Magdalenian man to the present. "[W] e do know definitely that from the earliest times until today human beings
the world over have given expression to human experience in
concrete tangible forms which we call works of art." 1 CivilizaI GARDNER, ART THROUGH THE AcEs 1 (1926).
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tion has recognized value in artistic creation--economic, political, utilitarian, or aesthetic-and states have afforded it
various forms of protection. Copyright statutes relating to the
fine arts can be found in England as far back as 1735,2 and in
the United States dating from 1790. a
Of all the fields of creative endeavor afforded protection by
our current copyright statutes,4 none would seem to encompass
such an extensive and variegated array of items as does the
category "works of art." The Copyright Act provides that
"any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right: (a) To
print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work," '
and this protection is extended to "works of art; models or
designs for works of art." '
The U.S. Copyright Office has supplied the following description of the category:
Works of Art (Class G).
(a) General. This class includes published or unpublished works of
artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical
or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels,
glassware, and tapestries, as well as works belonging to the fine arts,
such as paintings, drawings, and sculpture.
(b) In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody
some creative authorship in its delineation or form ...
(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact
that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as

a work of art.

....

7

The multiplicity of items which have qualified within this
Geo. 2, c. 13 (1735) : "Whereas divers persons have by their own genius,
industry, pains, and expense, invented and engraved, or worked in Mezzotinto or
Chiaro Oscuro, sets of historical and other prints, in hopes to have reaped the
28

sole benefit of their labours; and whereas print-sellers and other persons have of
late, without the consent of the inventors, designers, and proprietors of such
prints, frequently taken the liberty of copying, engraving, and publishing or
causing to be copied, engraved, and published, base copies of such works, de-

signs, and prints, to the very great prejudice and detriment of the inventors,
designers, and proprietors thereof. ... "
417 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958).
3 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
e 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1958).
5 17 U.S.C. § 1 (a) (1958).
7 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1960).
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definition of "works of art" was noted by Justice Douglas in
a concurring opinion in Mazer v. Stein:
The Copyright Office has supplied us with a long list of such articles
which have been copyrighted-statuettes, bookends, clocks, lamps,
door knockers, candlesticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sun8
dials, salt and pepper shakers, fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays.
In view of the large range of objects encompassed by the
phrase "works of art," the present writer has confined his consideration to what has been referred to above as "the fine arts."
Except where otherwise noted, all cases discussed or noted
have involved drawings, paintings, engravings, sculpture, or,
in a few instances, photographs, the area of photography being increasingly the subject of artistic endeavor in recent
years. Though works of art have always served functional
purposes, at times for good and at times for bad, they have at
the same time been cherished in and for themselves.' It is
hoped that by limiting the scope of the present inquiry it will
be possible to determine the attitude of the courts to art qua
art, and that certain unanswered problems in this area may at
least be identified.
WHY PROTECT THE ARTIST?
The early English justices would appear to have possessed
a greater respect for an understanding of law than art,1" and
8 347

U.S. 201, 220-21 (1954).
9 PARKER, TIE PRINCIPLES OF AESTHETICS 14 (1946): "No matter what further

purpose artistic expressions may serve, they are produced and valued for themselves. . . . Any sort of practical purpose may be one motive in the creation of
a work of art, but its significance is broader than the success or failure of that
motive."
10 In Gambart v. Bal, 32 LJ.C.P. 166, 143n'
ng7ep: 463, 468 (1863), Chief
Justice Erle observes, "[W]e feel the same degree of pleasure in looking at the
forms and attitudes of the beautiful animals there portrayed whether we see them
in the size in which they are drawn in the original picture, or in the reduced size
of the engraving, or in the still more diminished form in which they appear in
the photograph." In Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim. 297, 58 Eng. Rep. 605, 606 (1833),
Sir L. Shadwell notes, "Then with respect to the Defendant representing his
copy as Martin's picture. It must be either better or worse; if it is better, Martin
has the benefit of it; if worse, then the misrepresentation is only a sort of libel,
and this court will not prevent the publication of a libel."
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seldom does one find an inclination to speak in terms of a
work of art as of value in itself." This is not to say that the
courts are not generous in the protection afforded, but the decisions are more often based on injury to the reputation of
the artist " or to the commercial value of the work of art."
The United States courts, while noting that there is no standard of artistic taste, 4 have nevertheless recognized that "the
concept of beauty expressed in the materials of statuary or
drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted." " And Justice
Reed, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954, said,
"Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered." 16
The basic philosophy underlying the decisions was enunciated by District Judge Kickinson in Pellegriniv. Allegrini:
The beautiful and the development of a love of the beautiful and of
the artistic sense and taste is as much necessary to a well-rounded life
as are the useful things. A like comment applies to our national life.
It is well, therefore, to encourage the production of works of art. The
policy is in line with, and in one sense an extension of, the policy
avowed in our Constitution "to promote the progress of science and
useful arts." Article 1, §8, cl. 8. These policies, if not the same, are
very much alike.17
21 Cf., Dicks v. Brooks, 15 Ch. D. 22, 35 (1880). James, L. J., makes reference
to "the print qua print," but goes on to refer to reputation and commercial value

in the same sentence.
2 Dicks v. Brooks, supra note 11; Gambart v. Ball, 32 L.J.C.P. 166, 143 Eng.
Rep. 463, 467 (1863).
13 Dicks v. Brooks, supra note 11; Gambart v. Ball, supra note 10, "Engravings
are things having a commercial value, and the statute gives protection to the
money value of the creation of the artist's mind." (Emphasis added.) Hansfstaengl
v. W. H. Smith & Sons, [19051 1 Ch. 519, 525, "[N]o alleged copy whether of a
picture or of an engraving can properly be held to be a copy within the meaning
of the statute and prohibited thereby unless commercial injury can be proved or
reasonably presumed."
'4 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ; Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
15
Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier, 16 F. Supp. 729, 732 (M.D. Pa. 1936), final
decree rendered,24 F. Supp. 393 (M.D. Pa. 1938). See also, Home Art, Inc. v.
Glensder Textile Corp., 81 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
16 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
17 2 F.2d 610-11 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
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Both the English and American cases have applied the general rule of copyright law to works of art in declaring that to
constitute infringement there must be a copying of a substantial part," or a copy "more or less servile," "9or similar language.20 What constitutes a substantial copying is always a
question of fact, but the decisions provide some guidance in
making the determination.
It is uniformly held that "slight"

21

or "colorable" 22 or

"trivial" 23variations are inconsequential in the determination

of infringement. The crucial question is whether there has
been a usurpation of the substantial ideas2 4 and "it is no defense that close scrutiny may detect slight differences." 25 The
18 Springer Lithographing Co. v. Falk, 59 Fed. 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1894), appeal
dismissed, 17 S.Ct. 998 (1896) ; M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co.,
137 F. Supp. 455, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freudlich,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 808, 809 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 73 F.2d 276 (1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 717 (1935) (infringement of animated cartoon character) ; Morrison v. Pettibone, 87 Fed. 330, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1897); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32, 35
(S.D.N.Y. 1893) ; Fishel v. Lueekel, 53 Fed. 499, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1892); Falk v.
Brett Lithographing Co., 48 Fed. 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1891) ; Moore v. Clark, 9
M. & W. 692, 152 Eng. Rep. 293 (1842); Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day, 32
T.L.R. 349 (1916).
1 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winniger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Pellegrini
v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
20
Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Contemporary Arts v.
F. W. Woolworth Co, 93 F. Supp. 739, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d 162
(2d Cir. 1951), af'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952), "[Ilt is not necessary that a copy be
a 'Chinese copy' in order to find infringement."; Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier,
supra note 15, "The test of infringement is whether the defendants have made
an original independent production or a copy of the plaintiff's work.";
Hansfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. 109, 130 ("conveying tolerably correct
21 ideas").
Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.
1927).
22
Munro v. Smith, 42 Fed. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) (differences more than
colorable) ; West v. Francis, 5 B. & Ald. 737, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1362 (1822).
2 Gross v. Seligman, 212 Fed. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
24
Springer Lithographing Co. v. Falk, supra note 18; Falk v. Donaldson,
supra note 18 ("Is the sculptor compelled to see his life work in marble appropriated, and modeled in soap or sugar, because forsooth, the 'dimples are lacking' from the imitation .. .?") ; Falk v. Brett Lithographic Co., supra note 18.
25 Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., supra note 21, at 161.
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fact that the picture is reverse in the copy will not prevent
infringement.2 6
It is not uncommon for an artist to infringe a copyright on a
work of his own creation. The case of Gross v. Seligman,27
which came before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
1947, involved two photographs made by the same professional photographer, the first sold to the plaintiffs with all
rights thereto, the second to the defendants. Both photographs
were of the same nude, though taken two years apart. The two
poses were identical with the exception that in the second "the
young woman now wears a smile and holds a cherry stem between her teeth," 28 and "some slight changes in the contours
of her figure are discoverable." 29 The court had no difficulty
in determining that the second picture was an infringement of
the first. "The one thing, viz., the exercise of artistic talent,
which made the first photographic picture a subject of copyright, has been used not to produce another picture, but to
duplicate the original." " The same principle would be applicable to paintings.31
SIMILAR INDEPENDENT WORK
Some of the more difficult factual problems arise when the
defendant readily admits that his work is substantially similar
to that of the plaintiff but argues that it was independently
produced-that the similarity is a result of pure coincidence.
Or, an even more common situation, the two artists have used
the same source of inspiration in conceiving their work-perhaps both have made replicas of artistic works in the public
domain. How are these cases to be distinguished from those
discussed above?
In the Seligman case,32 the court made clear the point that
26 Falk v. Brett Lithographic Co., supra note 18.
28
Ibid.
27 212 Fed. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
31 Ibid.
32 Supra note 27.
30 Ibid.

29

Id. at 931.
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if there had in fact been an independent production, the similarity of the pictures would not have made the second an
infringement.
Of course when the first picture has been produced and copyrighted
every other artist is entirely free to form his own conception of the
Grace of Youth, or anything else, and to avail of the same young
woman's services in making it permanent, whether he works with pigments or a camera. If, by chance, the pose, background, light, and
shade, etc., of this new picture were strikingly similar, and if, by
reason of the circumstance that the same young woman was the prominent feature in both compositions, it might be very difficult to distinguish the new picture from the old one, the new would still not be
an infringement
of the old because it is in no true sense a copy of
33
the old.

A more difficult problem confronted the Southern District
of New York in Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger.4 In this
case, the plaintiff had created a minutely detailed reproduction of Rodin's "Hand of God." The reproduction did not

constitute an exact replica in that the original work had been
reduced in size, a fact which, the plaintiff contended, increased
the difficulty of the work and required "an extremely skilled
sculptor" for its execution. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was marketing products which made use of the artistic
work contained in his reproduction. The defendant argued
that his work was an original interpretation.
The court observed that where both plaintiff and defendant
have used an object in the public domain, or any common
source, for their work, mere resemblance will not constitute
an infringement.35 In line with the reasoning in the Seligman
case, the court said, "Publication of identicalworks cannot be
33

d. at 931.
4177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
5Id. at 267. See also Allegrini v. De Angelis, 59 F. Supp. 248, 251 (E.D. Pa.
1945), af'd, 149 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16
F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Pellegrini v. Allegrini, supra note 19;
Munro v. Smith, supra note 22; 8 HALS RY, LAws OF ENGLAND 426 (3d ed.
1954).
3
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enjoined if it is the result of independent research." 86 But, at
the same time, "the availability to a defendant of other 'common sources' is not a defense to an action for copyright infringement if the defendant actually copied the plaintiff's
work." " The court found that in this case the evidence supported the argument that the work had in fact been copied.
It would appear from these cases that whenever the defendant can successfully show that the allegedly infringing object
was an independently created work, the defendant will not be
guilty of piracy, no matter how nearly the works approximate
each other.
At least one case has suggested that where the defendant has
produced both the original and the allegedly infringing work
the degree of similarity between the two necessary to constitute infringement may depend to some extent on the latitude
of talent possessed by the defendant. In Esquire,Inc. v. Varga
Enterprises, Inc.,"8 the plaintiff had hired the defendant to
produce for it a number of "girl" paintings.89 The plaintiff
claimed that subsequent to the repudiation of the contract the
defendant caused to be published elsewhere four paintings
which were copied from paintings previously submitted to the
plaintiff and which had been copyrighted by the plaintiff. The
court in its opinion scrupulously compared each pair of paintings to show the distinctions between them and held that these
were all independently created works. Typical of the comparisons were the following:
6

See

Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, supra note 34, at 267 (emphasis supplied).
ADmiU,

COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE

70 (1936), "[Ut is possible to have

a plurality of valid copyrights directed to closely identical or even identical
works. Moreover, none of them, if independently arrived at will constitute an
infringement of the copyright of the others."
37 Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, supranote 34, at 268.
38 81 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Il. 1948), aff'd on this point, 185 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.

1950).
39 "This particular form of art portrays women in a state of semi-nudity and

emphasizes, or rather over-emphasizes, many of the physical details peculiar to
the female anatomy." 81 F. Supp. at 307.
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Hair-Accused's hair is long and gathered at the base of the neck;
Original's is combed upward to the top of the head in the well-known
"upsweep" coiffure ....
Shoulders-due to the different positions of
the arms, there is a slightly different muscular effect in the vicinity
of the shoulders and upper back. 40

Significant to the decision reached by the court is this statement made by District Judge Campbell in defending this rigid
examination of the paintings:
Any attempt to point out the distinguishing elements of the various
paintings should be prefaced by the observation that the over one
hundred paintings by defendant in evidence reveal that defend-

ant's artistic talent is limited to the portrayal of the female figure in
varying degrees of undress. . . . It is apparent from the testimony
that this is all he has ever drawn and seems to be all he ever will draw.
It follows, therefore, that all his future drawings will bear some simi-

larity to his previous work, whether or not his past creations are
before him at the time he is painting.41

This court, then, is not looking merely at the works of art
involved in the litigation. What if the purported copies had
not been made by the creator of the original? If they had been
made by a specialist in seascapes, for example, would the
court have held differently? Would distinctions between the
paintings such as those quoted above have been a substantial
variance so as to constitute an independent work? Obviously,
the Esquireopinion suggests that the decision might have been
different, and, at the very least, the presumption of an independently created painting would be significantly weakened.
The present case has not been subsequently cited on this
particular point. So far as this writer is able to determine,
similar reasoning has been employed in no other decision relating to artistic copyrights. If it were to be followed in the
future, it would represent a significant development in copyright law, for it has been a cardinal principle that the test of
infringement is the apparence of a copying to the ordinary
40 Id. at 308.

41

Id. at 307-08.

42 See infra note

50.
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observer." Here a court has suggested that the talents and
abilities of the accused infringer may be a material factor in
determining liability. Needless to say, such qualities are not
readily apparent to the ordinary observer upon examination
of the artistic works.
"THE ORDINARY OBSERVER!'
A considerable amount of recent art criticism has suggested
that many of the masters of fine art "borrowed" portions of
their works from previously created works. One writer4 4 persuasively demonstrates the similarity between a portion of
Rembrandt's etching "Christ Driving Money Changers from
the Temple," and a woodcut by Durer made a century before;
between Gauguin's "We Shall not Go to Market Today" and
an ancient Egyptian frieze; and even between Picasso's abstract human figures and drawings made 2,700 years ago on
the walls of buildings in what is now Turkey. A similar comparison has been made between the abstract work of the contemporary artist Jackson Pollock, and the realistic paintings
of Thomas Hart Benton, under whom the former studied.4 5
Though undoubtedly none of the examples cited above
would give rise to a justiciable controversy, they do give rise
to a new area of possible infringement. The courts have held
as a general rule that the mode used in copying is of no consequence in determining infringement.4 6 But what about variations in style? Would the holder of a copyright in a realistic
portrait painting, for example, have a cause of action against
one who had, using the first painting as his sole inspiration,
created an abstract interpretation of the same subject?
Apparently no case has yet reached the appellate level
based on facts such as these, but the statements made by the

4' See following section.
44 Watson, "Borrowing of the Masters," American Artist, Feb. 1960, p. 38.
4' "Baffling U.S. Art: What It Is About," Life, Nov. 9, 1959, p. 10.
4 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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courts leave little doubt that the charge of infringement would
not be sustained, barring visible evidence of a substantial
similarity. Repeatedly, the courts are heard to say that the
existence of a substantial copying is to be determined by the
appearance to the "ordinary observer," 4 or the "ordinary
reasonable person," 48 or other language connoting the same
idea. 49 The proof of similarity must be found in the works of
art themselves.' 0 Consistent with this notion, there has been a
tendency to be wary of the use of expert testimony to demonstrate similarities."
Although the "ordinary observer" test, or "audience" test,
47 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1960) (infringement of ornamental cloth design copied from work of art);
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 717 (1935) (infringement of animated cartoon character) ; Allegrini v. De Angelis, supra note 35.
4
s Contemporary Arts v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 93 F. Supp. 739, 744 (D. Mass.
1950) ; Allegrini v. De Angelis, supra note 35.
"9West v. Francis, 5 F. & Ald. 737, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1363, "A copy is that
which comes so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea
created
by the original."
" 0Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Golding v.
R.K.O. Pictures, 35 Cal. 2d 690, 221 P.2d 95, 101 (1950), "ED]issection may he
necessary to define the existence and extent of a plaintiff's property interest, and
on the issue of similarity the test is always that of the average observer comparing such property interest with the alleged copy made by the defendant" [infringement of stage play by motion picture]. See also, Carman, The Function of
the Judge and Jury in the "Literary Property" Lawsuit, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 52
(1954).
51 Contemporary Arts v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 93 F. Supp. 739, 743-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Allegrini v. De Angelis, supra note 35, "The court must determine whether or not the fact of infringement is proven; and the opinion of
experts, although helpful, may not be substituted for the court's judgement.";
Falk v. Donaldson, supra note 18; Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., 40 Cal. 2d
823, 256 P.2d 933, 940 (1953), "[TIhe standard of the ordinary observer should
be applied and comparison of the protectible portions should he made without
dissection and without expert or elaborate analysis." [infringement of a commonlaw copyright in a manuscript by a motion picture]; Fox, Evidence of Plagiarism
in the Law of Copyright, 6 U. TORONTO L.J. 414, 452 (1946), "[Ilt may be said
that the courts, while ready to hear the testimony of expert witnesses and to
benefit by the assistance which they give in the way of carefully prepared and
critical analyses and comparisons of the works involved in an action, are rather
disposed . . . to consider themselves more properly the arbiters of originality
and plagiarism and to base their conclusions on their own literary, dramatic,
musical, or artistic perceptions."
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as it is sometimes referred to, is a firmly accepted doctrine of
copyright law, particularly in the area of the fine arts, it is not
without its critics. This writer would tend to agree with the
proposition that artistic works are not always created for, nor
understood by, the "ordinary observer." By comparison, in
the area of patent infringement it would be considered sheer
folly to expect a jury to determine the similarities or differences between two intricate and complex machines on the
basis of "ordinary observation." The copying involved in
such a situation very possibly would not be readily apparent
to the eye. Can it be denied that there is more to a work of art
than that which meets the eye? Are there not more subtle
ways of pirating the genius of another than by superficial similarities?
One writer 52 has observed,
[T]here can be no dispute that the "spontaneous and immediate"
reactions of the ordinary observer are relevant evidence in determining whether works were copied, but stealing and the immediate impression of stealing are not the same thing. ... [I]t is unlikely that
the basic purpose of the Act is merely to protect against the general
public's "spontaneous and immediate" impression that these fruits
have been stolen. . . .Ordinary observers may very easily find a
literary product enjoyable and worth paying for without being able to
recognize that it is the product of the plaintiff's creative effort,
and
53
that all the defendant has contributed is a shrewd disguise.

It should be noted that in a few cases involving dramatic
property " and musical property 5 5 the courts have been persuaded to rely more heavily upon expert testimony, and occa52

Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1137
(1951) (Footnotes omitted.).

0 The context of the article would not indicate that the phrase "a literary
product" was used in the above quotation for the purpose of excluding works
of54the fine arts.
Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1938).

55Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946); Wilkie v.

Santly Bros., Inc., 91 F.2d 978 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 735 (1937);

Montgomery v. United States, 290 Fed. 961 (7th Cir. 1923) ; Arnstein v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 29 F. Supp 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
See also Orth, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Musical Infringement Cases, 16
U. PiTT.L. REv. 232 (1955).
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sionally one will find judicial criticism of the general rule. 6
To date, however, no cases would appear to have reached the
appellate level in which expert testimony has been seriously
considered regarding works of the fine arts. It would seem that
works of art and sculpture, at least as much as these other
categories, are a field so specialized as to deserve examination
and evaluation by experts, and that "on matters that appeal to
a more intelligent, artistically aware audience, full resort to
intelligence should be brought to bear on the determination of
infringement." "
OTHER FACTORS IMMATERIAL IN DETERMINING
INFRINGEMENT
Numerous other distinguishing features have been held by
the courts as immaterial in determining copyright infringement. Thus it has been the attitude of the courts that the artistic
merit of the defendant's work either by itself or as compared
to that of the plaintiff is of no consequence.5" It may even be
the case that the defendant's copy is more meritable than the
original,59 but still the original creator is to be protected.
Justice Holmes, in ruling that a circus poster was a work of
art, ° maintained that the courts were not prepared to consider
artistic genius in reaching decisions. "It may be more than
doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when
seen for the first time." 61 It also follows that whether the defendant's work is of marketable quality makes no difference."6 3
Differences which relate merely to size are unimportant.
6

Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., supra note 54, at 536.

57 Orth, supra note 55, at 260.

58 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., supra note 14; Pellegrini v. Allegrini, supra note 14; Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed. 136, 137 (N.D. Ill.
1907);
Allegrini v. De Angelis, supra note 35; Falk v. Donaldson, supra note 18.
59Pellegrini v. Allegrini, supra note 14.
60 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
61
Id.at 251.
62
Fishel v. Lueckel, supra note 18; Hansfstaengl v. Empire Palace, supra
note 20.
6 Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 37 Fed. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1888) : Gambart v. Ball,
supra note 10.
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But what if the alleged copy of the plaintiff's work is of only
part of that work? Again it would appear that infringement
will turn on whether there has been a substantial copying. In
Fishel v. Lueckel 64 the court said, "The appropriation of part
of a work is no less an infringement than the appropriation of
the whole, provided 'the alleged infringing part contains any
substantial repetitions of any material parts which are original and distinctive.'" 6 5
The fact that the plaintiff's work was incomplete at the time
of the alleged copying provides no defense. In Beifeld v.
Dodge Publishing Co.,66 the defendant contended that there
was no infringement of the plaintiff's painting, because the
copying was of a preliminary sketch which the plaintiff had
made prior to the completion of the painting. The court held
that even if the preliminary drawing had been completed before the painting was begun, the copyright on the painting
would protect the sketch as well, and a copying of the sketch
would constitute an infringement. The court reasoned that if
the plaintiff had himself attempted to sell the preliminary
sketch after selling the painting, such a sale would infringe the
copyright on the painting. Thus, it concluded, in legal contemplation, the two works are the same.
THE MODE OF COPYING
The methods used in duplicating the works of art involved
in infringement cases have been varied, and often ingenious.
Generally, the cases have held that the mode employed in
copying is immaterial.6
" 53
65

Fed. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1892).
1d. at 500. See also Morrison v. Pettibone, supra note 18; The London
Stereoscopic and Photographic Co. v. Kelly, [18881 5 T.L.R. 169.
66198 Fed. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). See also, Fishel v. Lueekel, 53 Fed. 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1892).
67
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951);
M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 137 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa.
1956); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936);
Bracken v. Rosenthal, 151 Fed. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1907) ; Werckmeister v. Pierce &

The Fine Arts

79

One of the earliest problems to confront the English courts
was the tableau vivant, or "living picture." This innovation involved the arrangement of human beings and scenery in such
a manner as to duplicate the image produced by the plaintiff's
picture. In an early case,6" the Chancery court ruled that such
a representation did not constitute an infringement of the
plaintiff's copyright. But following the passage of the Copyright Act of 1911,69 the problem was again brought before the
court, 70 and the living picture was held to be an infringement.7 1

Much earlier, in 1859, an Irish court had held that where the
defendant had arranged a "living picture" and photographed

it, the photograph constituted an infringement of the plaintiff's
copyright.72
Other more conventional forms of copying have generally
afforded no difficulty. A water color painting may be infringed

by an oil, or a crayon, or a lithographic facsimile." A lithoBushnell Mfg. Co., 63 Fed. 445 (D. Mass. 1894), rev'd on other grounds, 72 Fed.
54 (1st Cir. 1896); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1893); Falk v.
Brett Lithographic Co., 48 Fed. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1891) ; Falk v. T. P. Howell &
Co., 37 Fed. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1888); Schumacher v. Schwencke, 30 Fed. 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1887); Rossiter v. Hall, 20 Fed. Cas. 1253 (No. 12082) (E.D.N.Y.
1886) ; Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. Rep. 121; Frost & Reed v. Olive Series
Publishing Co., [1859] 24 T.L.R. 649 (1908); Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day,
supra note 18; Ex parte Beal, L.R. 3 Q.B. 387 (1868). In Gambart v. Ball, 32
LJ.C.P. 166, 143 Eng. Rep. 463 (1863), the defendant contended that a photograph could not infringe an engraving since the art of photography was not
known at the time the copyright act was passed. In holding for the plaintiff,
Chief Justice Erle said, "I see no reason why these very wide and general words
should not be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning, and be
held to apply to any mode of copying known at that time and to such other modes
of multiplying copies as the ingenuity of man may from time to time discover."
6
sHanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, Ltd., [1894] 3 Ch. 109.
691 &2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (1911).
7
o Bradbury, Agnew & Co. v. Day, supra note 18.
71
' Ibid. Justice Coleridge, speaking for the courts, said, "Before 1911 the law
protected the design, which meant the particular form in which the idea was
embodied, and since 1911 the law has protected that embodiment, whatever be
the medium in which it was expressed. [f the embodiment of the idea or any
substantial
part of it was copied, copyright was infringed."
7
2 Turner v. Robinson, supra note 67.
73 Schumacher v. Schwencke, supra note 67, at 691 (dictum).
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graph may infringe a copyrighted photograph. 4 A photograph
may be an infringement of a piece of statuary " or an engraving.7 6 And a photograph which combines the plaintiff's photograph and an independently made drawing may infringe the
original photograph. 7 Finally, in Falk v. T. P. Howell &
Co.,7" the Southern District of New York held that the
plaintiff's photograph would be infringed when the defendant
stamped a raised figure, like the picture, on the leather out of
which he made the bottoms and backs of chairs. And the same
court, sixty years later, held a scarf design to infringe the
copyright on an oil painting reproduction. 9
COPY OF A COPY
To this point consideration has only been given to those
situations in which the defendant was accused of copying the
original work of art. Additional problems arise in those cases
in which there is a dispute as to whether the alleged infringing
copy was based upon the original or upon a reproduction.
It is germane to this discussion to note here a feature which
distinguishes artistic works from other forms of creative endeavor. The copyright of such works, with the exception of
photographs, attaches to their physical embodiment."0 That is
to say, the copyright of a painting provides protection for certain bits of pigment applied with certain brush strokes on a
particular canvas. The copyright of a statuary is related to a
given piece of granite, etc. By contrast, when a literary work
is copyrighted, a percise copy may be made of the protected
words-by typing, by writing in longhand, by any method
74

Falk v. Donaldson, supra note 67; Falk v. Brett Lithographic Co., supra

note 67.
75 Bracken v. Rosenthal, supra note 67; M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh
Brewing
Co., supra note 67.
7
6 Rossiter v. Hall, supra note 67; M. J. Golden & Co. v. Pittsburgh Brewing
Co., supra note 67; Gambart v. Ball, supra note 67.
77 Lumiere v. Path6 Exch., Inc., 275 Fed. 428 (2d Cir. 1921).
7s 37 Fed. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1888).
79 Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., supra note 15.
So Cf. 47 L.Q. Rtv. 332 (1931).
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whatever, and, for that matter, in any language. The fact that
the infringing work does not physically look like the original
is immaterial. In the same fashion, what is protected by a
musical copyright is not the sheets of paper inscribed with
symbols; it is the melody represented by those symbols. Any
accurate copying will produce the same combination of sounds
when played by an accomplished musician.
Such is not the case with works of art. It would not be inaccurate to say that it is actually impossible to make a true
copy of a copyrighted painting or work of sculpture. Only
approximations of the original can be made, a fact which has
been dramatically brought home to any person of normal perception who has had the opportunity of comparing only a few
paintings with their reproductions.
Because of this it has long been recognized that the making
of reproductions of art is an art in itself."1 In Alfred Bell &
Co. v. CataldaFine Arts, Inc., 2 District Judge Smith said:
Of course, the ideas for the subject are entirely those of the first artist,
the painter. What is original with the engraver is the handling of the
painting in another medium to bring out the engraver's conception of
the total effect of the old master. The engraver is not trying to alter
or improve on the old master. He is trying to express in another
medium what the original artist expressed in oils on canvas.

In implementing the protection provided for reproductions
by the Copyright Act,
category as follows:

3

the Copyright Office has described the

Reproductions of works of art (Class H).
This class includes published reproductions of existing works of art in
the same or a different medium, such as lithograph, photoengraving,
84
etching or drawing of a painting, sculpture or other work of art.

Thus in the area of artistic copyright there arises the unique
situation in which the same work of art may be the subject of
two or even more copyrights.
81

Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.

1951); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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74 F. Supp. 973, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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17 U.S.C. § 5 (h) (1958).

84 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 (1960).
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In an 1887 case, Schumacher v. Schwencke, s5 the plaintiff
held a copyright on an original painting. The plaintiff made
lithographic copies of the painting, which were not in themselves copyrighted. The defendant made copies of the plaintiff's work, from the lithographic copies. The defendant contended, and apparently it was not challenged by the plaintiff,
that he had in fact never even seen the original work of art.
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, saying:
It by no means follows from the fact that the law recognizes a distinction between a painting and a print that a copyright for the former
will not protect its owner in the sale of copies thereof, even though
they may appropriately be called prints. It is clear that the defendants
are wrong-doers. They have invaded the complainants' territory. They
have copied the painting. It is immaterial how this was accomplished,
whether directly or indirectly. They have copied a lithograph which
was protected by the complainants' copyright, and have thus attempted
unlawfully, and without due recompense, to reap the fruits of the complainants' genius and enterprise.8 6
Sixteen years later, in Champney v. Haag, 7 the plaintiff's
copyrighted painting had been reproduced by a copyrighted
photograph. This action was brought for an infringement of
the copyright in the painting. Upon the trial of the case, the
evidence showed that the defendant's copies were made from
the photograph and not from the painting. The court held that
there was an infringement of the copyright on the photograph
but not on the painting. It said that the plaintiff would have to
show that the illustrations in question were not copied from
the photograph, a requirement which he failed to meet.
It is possible to reconcile these two decisions on the basis
that in the Schumacher case there was but a single copyrightthat on the original work; in the Champney case, both the
original and the reproduction had been copyrighted. But considering the vociferous language used in the Schumacher
opinion, in guaranteeing the original work an absolute protection from infringement, it would appear more likely that that
8'
87

30 Fed. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1887).
121 Fed. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1903).

86 Id. at 691-92.
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court would not have agreed with the Champney decision and
would have held the defendant to have infringed the protection afforded for both the original painting and the photograph.
The Southern District of New York followed the reasoning of the Champney case (though not referring to it) in a
recent case " in which the opposite situation was presented.
The plaintiff was the owner of a copyrighted reproduction, and
the defendant contended that his copy constituted no infringement, because he had copied the original oil painting. Though
the ruling was for the plaintiff, the court indicated that the defendant would not have been liable if the evidence had supported his contention.
The rule is clearly sound in this latter decision. It could
hardly be denied that when a third party makes a reproduction of an original work he has not infringed the copyright on
another reproduction. He has not utilized the talents of the
first reproducer. But in the original situation, where the third
party copies the reproduction, it would likewise appear clear
that the injury done extends beyond the reproduction to the
original work. The concept of beauty expressed in the materials of statuary or drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted. 9 The aesthetic value to be found in the reproduction is for the very large part contingent upon the artistic
genius of the creator of the work.
The Schumacher and Champney cases were both decided
prior to the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909. This act
required, inter alia, that a copyrighted work of art or reproduction carry notice of copyright,9" a requirement which had
been present in the previous act, 9 ' but contained a new provision that where the copyright proprietor had omitted the
notice by accident or mistake the act would "prevent the recovery of damages against an innocent infringer who has been

88 Home Art, Inc. v. Glensder Textile Corp., supranote 15.

90 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
s9 See cases cited note 15 supra.
01 Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 1, 18 Stat. 79.
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misled by the omission of the notice." 92 If notice were intentionally omitted, the copyright would be forfeited.93 The problem of notice did not confront the court in the previously discussed cases. With this enactment, it became a determination
precedent to the question of copying.
94 a photograph of the plaintiff's oil
In Leigh v. Barnhart,
painting appeared in a magazine, but the magazine inadvertently failed to identify it as copyrighted. The plaintiff did not
hold a copyright on the reproduction.95 The defendants had
made copies of the reproduction in the magazine. The court
denied relief to the plaintiff as there was no notice given to the
defendants of the copyright. This is the only case decided since
the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909 that the present
writer has been able to uncover in which the holder of the
copyright on an original work of art has brought an action for
infringement against one who has copied from a reproduction
in which the plaintiff did not hold the copyright. The court
strongly implies here that if there had been a compliance with
the statutory requirement of notice, the plaintiff would have
been entitled to relief, as well as would the holder of the copyright on the reproduction.
CONCLUSION
The number of cases involving infringement of works of the
fine arts to come before the appellate courts has been relatively
small, a fact which has no doubt impeded the development of
the law in this area to some extent. The lack of controversies
may be attributed to a number of reasons. Works of art are
normally not channeled through publishing outlets in the same
12Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960).
03 17 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
9496 F. Supp. 194 (D.NJ. 1951).

9
' Plaintiff contended that the magazine had assigned the copyright in the
reproduction to him, but the court found that it had only unsuccessfully attempted to reconvey the copyright in the original, which in fact the plaintiff had

never given up.
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manner as are literary and musical compositions. As a result,
many artists receive little guidance in the marketing of their
material and thus are virtually unaware of their legal rights
so far as their creations are concerned. Furthermore, piracy
is not so common in this area as in others because of the manifest difficulties entailed in copying-in many instances, it
would take another artist to substantially copy a work of art.
Finally, the factual requirements for proving an infringement
would appear at times quite difficult to fulfill, especially in
cases of like reproductions of works in the public domain.
At present, the great weight of authority would confine the
determination of infringement to a comparison of the works
of art involved in the controversy. In suggesting that the court
should go beyond the paintings themselves and that the defendant's artistic talent should be taken into account, the
Esquire decision is quite obviously not in line with the prevailing attitude. Due to the particular facts there involved, the
defendant's abilities would appear quite relevant to a fair disposal of the case. But to extend the principle beyond this narrowly defined fact situation would be exceedingly dangerous.
Virtually every proficient artist's works are stylistically similar to some extent, at least enough that his works can be recognized as his. Should the courts examine all of an artist's work
in order to find out if there is a substantial similarity between
two of these works? Or is the fact that "girl" paintings are
aesthetically inferior, or easily produced, or not of lasting
value, important? Any of these approaches would go against
the grain of recognized copyright law and plunge the courts
into the area of artistic value determinations, an area which
they have systematically avoided in infringement cases in the
past.
The more difficult problems confronted in all infringement
cases are factual, 6 and it would at least appear questionable
9 Yankwich, Legal Protection of Ideas-A Judge's Approach, 43 VA. L. REv.
375, 379 (1957).
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that the standards applied by the courts are completely satisfactory. The adoption of the familiar "reasonable man" legal
standard in the guise of the "ordinary observer" would not
seem in all cases equal to the task of determining piracy. One
United States district judge has said that the best the judges
can do in cases of this nature is to "seek to approximate the
median impression." " The present writer would suggest that
though the impression of the "ordinary observer" is an important consideration, to limit the proof of infringement this
narrowly would be in effect to sanction many real but subtle
methods of piracy. It is to be hoped that in the area of the
fine arts we shall see an increasing reliance upon expert witnesses in the future; in this respect, the artistic works decisions
would not appear to have kept pace with those in other types
of copyright infringement.
If, as Justice Reed has said, "Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with
the services rendered," " it would certainly seem that any
piracy should be prevented, whether visible to the "ordinary
observer" or not. Concomitantly, where the defendant has
substantially copied a reproduction of the plaintiff's work,
the artistic ability which the plaintiff has embodied in the
work has been wrongfully used, and the plaintiff should be
allowed redress, regardless of whether he holds a copyright
on the reproduction.
97 Ibid.

98 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).

